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In a recent work [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 3838 (2011)], the authors proposed a simple
measure for network robustness under malicious attacks on nodes. With a greedy algorithm, they
found the optimal structure with respect to this quantity is an onion structure in which high-degree
nodes form a core surrounded by rings of nodes with decreasing degree. However, in real networks the
failure can also occur in links such as dysfunctional power cables and blocked airlines. Accordingly,
complementary to the node-robustness measurement (Rn), we propose a link-robustness index (Rl).
We show that solely enhancing Rn cannot guarantee the improvement of Rl. Moreover, the structure
of Rl-optimized network is found to be entirely different from that of onion network. In order to
design robust networks resistant to more realistic attack condition, we propose a hybrid greedy
algorithm which takes both the Rn and Rl into account. We validate the robustness of our generated
networks against malicious attacks mixed with both nodes and links failure. Finally, some economical
constraints for swapping the links in real networks are considered and significant improvement in
both aspects of robustness are still achieved.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb,89.75.Hc,05.10.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of the infrastructure in modern society is
of great importance. Systems like internet, power grids,
transportation and fuel distribution networks need to be
robust and capable of surviving from random failures
or intentional attacks [1]. Many processes taking place
on networks might be significantly influenced and show-
ing low degree of tolerance to damage on their struc-
tures [2, 3]. Examples of such processes in nature and
society include epidemic spreading [4, 5], synchroniza-
tion [6–8], random walks [9, 10], traffic [11, 12] and opin-
ion formation [13, 14]. Therefore, the robustness for dif-
ferent network structures was intensively studied in the
past decade [15–19]. It is also revealed that the short-
est path [20] and graph spectrum [21] can be employed
to estimate the network robustness. Moreover, interde-
pendent network [22, 23] is proposed to model the catas-
trophic cascade of failures in real systems.
In a recent work, a new measure for network robust-
ness under malicious attack on nodes is proposed [24].
This measurement, which we call node-robustness in
this paper, considers the size of the largest compo-
nent during all possible malicious attacks, namely Rn =
1
N
∑
1
q=1/N S(q), where N is the number of nodes in the
network and S(q) is the fraction of nodes in the largest
connected cluster after removing qN nodes. The normal-
ization factor 1/N makes robustness of networks with
different sizes comparable. A robust network is gener-
ally corresponding to a large Rn value. With this mea-
surement, a greedy algorithm is designed to enhance the
node-robustness in real systems and large improvement
is observed even a small number of links are modified.
Moreover, the optimal structure for node-robustness is
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found to be an onion structure in which high-degree
nodes are highly connected with rings of nodes with de-
creasing degree surrounding. Lately, some simple meth-
ods were also proposed to generate such robust onion
networks [25].
However, the analysis in ref. [24] is only based on the
targeted attacks on nodes. In reality, failures can happen
in connections between nodes as well [18]. For example,
the power cables can be dysfunctional and some airlines
can be blocked due to the terrible weather or terrorist
attacks. In this paper, we propose a link-robustness in-
dex (Rl) to measure the ability of network to resist link
failures. We find that solely enhancing Rn cannot always
improve Rl and the network structure for optimal Rl is
far different from the onion network. In order to design
robust network resistant to different kinds of malicious
attacks, we propose a greedy algorithm aiming for both
Rn and Rl improvement. To validate the robustness of
the resultant networks, we examined them against more
realistic attack strategy which combines both nodes and
links failure. Since the manipulation of real network al-
ways confront certain economical constraints, we finally
took these requirements into consideration in our method
and some significant improvement in both Rl and Rn are
still obtained.
II. LINK-ROBUSTNESS OF NETWORKS
Since a robust network should be able to resist the
most destructive attack, we begin our analysis by com-
paring the harmfulness caused by different malicious at-
tack strategies on links. The most destructive attack is
supposed to destroy the most “important” links in the
networks. Like ref. [24], we monitor the size of giant
component to estimate how the network gets destroyed
after these “important” links are removed step by step.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The change of the relative size of the
giant component S(p) with the fraction of links p removed by
different strategies in Barabasi-Albert (BA) networks. The
original BA network is with N = 100 and k¯ = 6. The results
are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
There are many methods to measure the “importance”
of links, here we mainly consider three indexes to identify
the most important link to delete. The indexes include
edge-betweenness, link clustering coefficient and degree
product. We also use the random link removal as a bench-
mark for comparison. In order to simulate a more harm-
ful strategy, we apply a dynamical approach in which
the “importance” of the links (i.e. edge-betweenness,
link clustering coefficient and degree product) are re-
calculated during the attack. Fig. 1 reports how the
relative size of the giant component S(p) changes with
the fraction of links p removed by different strategies in
a Barabasi-Albert (BA) network model. Obviously, the
most destructive strategy is the one based on the edge-
betweenness. This is because the links with high betwee-
ness are with many shortest paths passing through. If
they are cut, many nodes cannot communicate with each
other and the networks are likely to break into pieces.
Specifically, though the degree-based node attack strat-
egy can make a severe damage to the network, cutting
the links connecting high degree nodes leads to even less
harmful effect than the random removal method to the
network connectivity. This is reasonable because the
hubs can be strongly connected with each other, and this
is well known as the rich-club phenomenon [26].
According to the analysis above, we propose a link-
robustness index (Rl) based on the highest edge-
betweenness attack strategy as
Rl =
1
E
1∑
p=1/E
S(p), (1)
where E is the total number of links. This measure cap-
tures the network response to any fraction of link re-
moval. Apparently, if a network is robust against link
attack, its Rl should be relatively large.
In ref. [24], it is found that the most robust structure
for node attack is the onion-like network, which is corre-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The Rl of BA networks with N = 100
and k¯ = 6, the corresponding Rn-optimized and Rl-optimized
networks. The results are averaged over 100 independent re-
alizations.
sponding to the topology with maximum Rn. However,
it is still unclear whether this structure is tolerant to
the link attack as well. In principle, a robust network
should have both large Rn and Rl since both the nodes
and links can fail due to some unexpected accidents. We
therefore report the Rl in BA networks and the corre-
sponding onion networks in fig.2. Interestingly, despite
the onion networks is resistant to malicious node attack,
it is weaker than the original BA networks with respect
to the intentional link attack. More specifically, the Rl
in onion network is 19.9% lower than the BA model (For
detail value, see table I).
Therefore, it is necessary to design a structural manip-
ulating method to enhance the link-robustness for net-
works. Since changing the degree of a node is commonly
assumed to be particular more expensive than changing
the connections, we keep invariant the degree of each
node in our algorithm. Starting from an original net-
work, we swap the connections of two randomly cho-
sen edges, i.e., we randomly select two edges ab and cd
(which connect node a with node b, and node c with
node d, respectively), then change them to ad and bc
only if Rnewl > R
old
l . We then repeat this procedure
with another randomly chosen pair of edges until no fur-
ther substantial improvement is achieved for a given large
number of consecutive swapping trials (Here, we set it as
104). In fig. 2, we can clearly see that the Rl can be
significantly improved by the algorithm. Compared to
the original BA network, Rl can be increased by 15.8%
(See table I for detail value).
III. IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS IN REAL
NETWORKS
In real systems, the failures can actually happen in not
only nodes but also links. For example, heavy snow can
break some power cables and aircraft mechanical prob-
lem can block certain airlines. Therefore, when design-
3TABLE I. Properties in the different networks: Node-robustness index (Rn), Link-robustness index (Rl), the spectrum of the
adjacency matrix (λ1/λ2), degree assortativity (r), average shortest path length (〈d〉) and clustering coefficient (〈C〉).
Network Algorithm Rn Rl λ1/λ2 r 〈d〉 〈C〉
Original 0.201 0.429 1.856 -0.181 2.576 0.142
BA Rn-optimized 0.352 0.343 2.579 0.158 2.828 0.117
Rl-optimized 0.200 0.497 1.891 -0.162 2.584 0.137
Hybrid-optimized 0.219 0.491 1.898 -0.153 2.583 0.133
Original 0.110 0.244 2.382 -0.208 2.738 0.625
USAir Rn-optimized 0.293 0.245 5.054 -0.148 2.875 0.280
Rl-optimized 0.111 0.319 2.631 -0.315 2.492 0.480
Hybrid-optimized 0.196 0.298 3.018 -0.237 2.593 0.429
Original 0.111 0.093 1.122 0.001 6.588 0.123
Grid Rn-optimized 0.240 0.173 1.404 0.356 6.128 0.015
Rl-optimized 0.125 0.248 1.192 0.019 4.974 0.024
Hybrid-optimized 0.161 0.237 1.272 0.110 5.017 0.031
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The change of the relative size of giant
components S when different networks are attacked by the
mixed strategy. The original network is USAir and the frac-
tion of node failure f is set as 0.5. The results are averaged
over 100 independent realizations.
ing the robust networks, we should take both Rn and
Rl into account. In order to achieve this objective, we
propose a hybrid greedy algorithm to manipulate the net-
work structure for better robustness. Different from the
process in the previous section, we swap the connections
of two randomly chosen edges only if both Rn and Rl
are improved. The swapping process stops if there is no
improvement in 104 trials.
Besides the BA network model, we further consider two
real systems: (1) USAir: the network of US air trans-
portation system [27], which contains 332 airports and
2126 airlines. (2) Grid: an electrical power grid of west-
ern Europe (mainly Portugal and Spain) [28], with nodes
representing generators, and links corresponding to the
high-voltage transmission lines between them. This net-
work contains 217 nodes and 320 links. Both real net-
works are well connected and without any isolated com-
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The change of the relative size of giant
components S when different networks are attacked by the
mixed strategy. The original network is Grid and the fraction
of node failure f is set as 0.5. The results are averaged over
100 independent realizations.
ponent.
For each network mentioned above, we obtained the
corresponding Rn-optimized, Rl-optimized and Hybrid-
optimized networks by the greedy algorithm and the re-
lated results are given in table I. As we can see from
the BA model and USAir network, optimizing Rn can-
not guarantee the improvement of Rl and optimizing Rl
cannot always increase Rn either. However, the hybrid
method can improve both Rn and Rl from the origi-
nal networks. More specifically, the Rn and the Rl are
increased respectively by 78.2% and 22.1% in the US-
Air network. In the Grid network, the improvement of
Rn is 46.4% and the increment of Rl can reach even
154.8%. Compared with Rn-optimized and Rl-optimized
networks, the hybrid-optimized networks do not have the
advantage in single aspect of robustness, but they are
kept with a reasonable balance between Rn and Rl.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The Q value of different networks when
f changes from 0 to 1. The original network is USAir. The
results are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the network ro-
bustness was formerly characterized by the spectrum of
the adjacency matrix (λ1/λ2), we however show that the
spectrum index has certain positive correlation with Rn
but doesn’t have obvious relation to Rl. Therefore, it ac-
tually only represents the node-robustness but cannot re-
flect the network robustness for link attack. The topology
properties of the resultant networks are also analyzed.
The result in table I shows that the hybrid-optimized
networks usually have larger assortativity, smaller av-
erage shortest path length and lower cluster coefficient
than the original networks. It has been revealed that
the optimal structure for Rn is the onion structure in
which nodes with almost the same degree are connected,
so the most significant feature for Rn-optimized network
is the large assortativity. For the aspect of Rl, since the
most destructive attack strategy is based on the highest
load (edge-betweenness), the less significant the commu-
nity structure is, the higher Rl will be. Consequently,
the robust network against to the link attack should be
with small average shortest path length and cluster coef-
ficient. Unlike the onion network, the Rl-optimized net-
works usually don’t have a large assortativity, which ex-
plains why the onion network don’t have a high Rl. For
the resultant network from the hybrid algorithm, they
will finally carry these topology properties from both Rn-
optimized and Rl-optimized networks.
Since the failures in nodes and links can happen si-
multaneously, a robust network should be able to resist
the attack from both ways. One interesting aspect to
consider is to see how the networks in table I react to
the attack combining node failures and link failures. Ac-
cordingly, we design a mixed attack strategy in which
the nodes will be removed with probability f and the
links will be cut with probability 1− f in each step. The
procedure goes on until the size of the giant component
reaches 0. We first set f = 0.5 as an example and report
in fig. 3 and 4 the performance of the networks in table
I. The results show that the hybrid-optimized networks
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The Q value of different networks
when f changes from 0 to 1. The original network is Grid.
The results are averaged over 100 independent realizations.
preserve the giant component most effectively.
We then consider the mixed attack process with f vary-
ing from 0 to 1. When f = 0, the process is just pure
highest load (edge-betweenness) attack on links. When
f = 1, it returns to the largest degree attack on nodes.
Here, we are mainly interested in the situation where
0 < f < 1. In order to estimate in which range of f the
hybrid-optimized network has advantage, we generalize
the definition of robustness to a quantity Q in the mixed
attack process,
Q =
1
M
M∑
step=1
S(step), (2)
where M is the total number of steps to entirely destroy
the network connectivity. Q measures how tolerant a
network against the malicious attack (which can be nodes
attack, link attack or mixed). According to Eq. (2),
Q = Rl when the f = 0 and Q = Rn when f = 1.
The Q value of the networks in table I under different
f are reported in fig. 5 and 6. Obviously, the original
networks performs worst under any f . The Rn-optimized
networks can indeed improve the Q value when f is large.
However, they don’t have too much advantage when f is
small. More specifically, in the USAir network (see fig.
5), the Rn-optimized network has almost the same Q
when f is smaller than 0.4. The Rl-optimized network
can significant improve the Q value when f is small, but
Q drops nearly back to the original network level when
f is large. The similar trend can be seen also in the
Grid network (fig. 6). These phenomena indicate that
the Rn-optimized network is very sensitive to link at-
tack while the Rl-optimized network is fragile when at-
tacked by nodes. The hybrid-optimized networks, how-
ever, perform very stable under different attack situa-
tions (i.e., different f), which suggests that the hybrid-
optimized network is a much more reliable structure in re-
ality, especially when the fraction of node and link failure
is unknown. Moreover, compared to the Rn-optimized
5and Rl-optimized networks, the hybrid-optimized net-
work can even enjoy a higherQ value in certain range of f
(0.2 ≤ f ≤ 0.75 in the USAir network and 0.1 ≤ f ≤ 0.9
in the Grid network). In other words, when the network
is attacked by both links and nodes, the hybrid-optimized
network seems to be the most robust structure.
Finally, we consider some economical constraint on im-
proving the robustness in the real system. First of all, the
total length (geographically calculated) of links cannot
be exceedingly large. Secondly, the number of changes
of links should be relatively small. Therefore, for recon-
structing the real networks like USAir and Grid, we add
two more constraints to the greedy algorithm: the swap
of two links is only accepted if the total geographic length
of edges does not increase, and both Rn and Rl are in-
creased more than certain values (denoted as ∆Rn and
∆Rl) [29]. With the strong constraints, Rn and Rl of
real networks can still be significantly improved. Specif-
ically, with only 3.9% links changed, the Rn and Rl of
the USAir network can be respectively increased by 56%
and 17% (Rn: from 0.110 to 0.172. Rl: from 0.244 to
0.285). In the Grid network, the Rn can be improved by
23% (from 0.111 to 0.136) and the Rl can be improved by
20% (from 0.093 to 0.112) with only 6.9% links changed.
IV. CONCLUSION
How to enhance the robustness of networks is an im-
portant topic, which is related to protecting the real sys-
tem from random failures and malicious attacks. In the
former literatures, most of the works focused on propos-
ing methods to improve the network robustness for the
attack on nodes. However, the connections between
nodes can be also damaged due to some unexpected ac-
cidents, which requires us to take the link failure into
account when designing robust networks. In this paper,
based on the highest load attack strategy, we propose the
link-robustness index to estimate how the network can
resist to the most destructive targeted attack on links.
Moreover, we designed a hybrid greedy algorithm to en-
hance both node-robustness and link-robustness. When
attacked by the strategy combining node and link failure,
the resultant networks from the hybrid method outper-
form the networks from solely improving either Rn or
Rl. Finally, some economical constraints are considered
when enhancing the robustness of real networks and some
significant improvement are observed.
Although the hybrid method can obtain a reliable net-
work which is generally robust to the attack mixed with
node failures and link failures, there are still some fur-
ther improvement can be achieved. In real system, the
probability of the node failure and link failure can be
different from one system to another. In the paper, we
accept the swap of links only if both Rn and Rl are in-
creased. However, one can sacrifice Rn a little bit for
larger improvement in Rl or the other way around since
these two robustness aspects ask for different structure
properties. Provided knowing the fraction of node failure
and link failure from the analysis of the historical data,
more effective greedy algorithm can be designed to gen-
erate suitable network structures for some specific real
systems.
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